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Excessive Defense Expenditures and Economic 
Stabilization: The Case of Pakistan 
Robert E. Looney, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
California 
INTRODUCTION 
Toward the end of 1988, Pakistan's deteriorating resource situa-
tion caused a financial crisis, many remnants of which still exist 
today. In 1988 the government's budget deficit reached 8.5 percent 
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), inflation accelerated, the cur-
rent account deficit doubled to 4.3 percent of Gross National 
Product (GNP), the external dept service ratio reached 28 percent 
of export earnings, and foreign exchange reserves fell in half, to 
$438 million, equal to less than 3 weeks of imports (World Bank, 
1991). 
These developments have eroded the ability of the government 
to affect the country's development process. In fact, the encourage-
ment of private-sector activity, particularly investment, is the only 
viable option open to the authorities. It follows that for policy 
purposes the most important issue involves restructuring govern-
ment expenditures and their financing in a manner that would 
provide the maximum inducement to private-sector capital forma-
tion, especially in manufacturing. Operationally, this means find-
ing an optimal balance between the government's three most 
important budgetary items: defense, public consumption, and in-
frastructural development. What is more important, because there 
is abundant evidence1 that the government's deficits have crowded 
out a certain amount of private investment, the authorities must 
ac~ieve, this balance within the context of a reduced level of expen-
ditures, tax increases, or both. 
1 See, for example, Kemal (1989), Burney and Yasmeen (1989), Khan and Iqbal (1991). 
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Defense expenditures are an obvious candidate for expenditure 
reductions. As noted in the next section, the country's defense 
burden is one of the heaviest in the world. At around 7 percent 
(1992) of Gross National Product (GNP), it is more than twice 
that of India. Moreover, while over recent years global defense 
expenditures have been declining, Pakistan's has expanded: From 
5.4 percent of GNP in 1980, it reached 6.8 percent in 1985. 
While the defense-expenditure-to-GNP ratio has remained 
about the same, debt servicing has overtaken this category as the 
single largest item of government spending. In 1971, this item was 
3 percent of GNP; by 1993-94, it had risen to 8.2 percent. During 
fiscal 1994-95, debt servicing will account for 8.2 percent or 35 
percent of total budget spending (Blum, 1994), compared with 26.4 
percent for defense (Rashid, 1994). Apparently the government 
recognizes the burden that defense expenditures have placed on 
the economy. For the 1994-95 budget, defense expenditure will 
increase only 8.6 percent, even though in the previous year India 
increased defense expenditures by 20 percent (Bokhari, 1994). 
Against this background the purpose of this paper is to examine 
Pakistan's macroeconomic prospects for the remainder of the 
1990s. In particular (and assuming it politically possible), we are 
interested in examining the scope for stimulating economic growth 
and expansion through restrained allocations to the military.2 
What impacts have defense expenditures had on the economy? 
Are these impacts largely direct, or have they operated primarily 
through their effect on the budgetary deficits? In this regard, 
defense expenditures are a logical area for budgetary cuts: Current 
expenditures account for the major part of government budgetary 
allocations, averaging 65-75 percent during most of the 1980s and 
into the 1990s. In recent years, defense expenditures together with 
debt servicirig have accounted for around 80 percent of current 
expenditures. 
PATTERNS OF DEVELOPMENT 
• 
While facing a number of serious macroeconomic constraints, 
Pakistan's overall economic performance in the 1980s and into 
the 1990s has been relatively good compared with that of most 
developing countries. While the country grew at the average ( 4.9% 
2 Hopefully this policy would be complemented by some of the innovative reforms 
outlined in Ahmed (1994). 
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per annum) rate for developing countries during the 1970s, during 
the 1980-91 period the economy expanded at an average annual 
rate of 6.1 percent. This compares very favorably with a developing 
average of 2.8 percent for the same period. If we compare Paki-
stan's economic structure and performance (during 1980-91) to 
other high-growth countries (those above the mean of 2.8% ), 
several other interesting patterns stand out: 
• Government consumption rose rapidly during the 1980s, aver-
aging 9.1 percent per annum. For other high-growth devel-
oping countries, this figure averaged 0.5 percent per annum. 
• Pakistan's inflation was about half that of other high-growth 
countries (7.0% versus 14.0% ). 
• Pakistan's growth during the 1980s occurred although the 
country had increased investment at a rate about one half that 
of other high-growth countries during the 1970s. However, 
during the 1980s, Pakistan's expansion of capital formation 
was considerably above (5.6% versus 3.6%) that of the high-
growth group. 
• Despite the country's superior growth rate during the 1980s, 
Pakistan's imports expanded at a rate significantly below 
(2.6% versus 4.0%) that of other high-growth developing 
countries. 
• In terms of the composition of demand, Pakistan differs from 
other high-growth countries in that it has a very low savings 
rate (12.0% versus 17.1 % for the high-growth countries). 
Also, Pakistan's exports account for only 16.0 percent of 
GNP, while this figure is around 27 percent for the high-
growth countries. 
• While government expenditures in Pakistan are relatively low 
for a high-growth country (21.9% versus 31.1 % ), its defense 
expenditures account for a much higher proportion of the 
budget (27.9% versus 12.5%.). 
• Pakistan started off the 1980s with a debt structure (share of 
GNP) was slightly above (42.4% versus 39.7%) that of other 
high-growth developing countries. However, its external debt 
as a share of GNP was considerably below the high-growth 
norm by 1991 (50.1 % versus 72.1 % ). 
• In contrast, Pakistan began the 1980s with a ratio of external 
debt to exports considerably higher (208.8% versus 149.7%) 
than that of other high-growth countries. While this ratio grew 
during the 1980s, that of the high-growth countries expanded 
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even faster, so that by 1991 each had external debt burdens 
of 244.9% of current exports. 
• Finally, relative to other high-growth countries, a much larger 
proportion of Pakistan's external debt is in the form of conces-
sional loans. While the proportion of Pakistan's loans that 
were concessional fell somewhat in the 1980s, this type of 
loan accounted for over half of the country's external debt. 
The corresponding figure for other high-growth countries was 
41.5 percent. Interestingly, the ratio for the low-growth coun-
tries was only 35.0 percent in 1991. 
Summing up, while one cannot infer causation from cross-sec-
tional analysis of this type, several patterns are suggestive as to 
the mechanisms characterizing Pakistani growth in the 1980s. First, 
the country seems to have been able to expand without contracting 
an excessive amount of external debt. This may have resulted 
from the fact that the government controls a relatively small share 
of resources. Second, it appears that the country was able to divert 
concessionary funding loans into military expenditures. If this 
is the case, it would· partially explain why the country's overall 
economic performance has been good despite the unusually large 
share of the budget devoted to defense. 
PREVIOUS STUDIES ON DEFENSE SPENDING AND THE 
MACRO ECONOMY 
While a comparative perspective provides some insights as to 
the workings of defense expenditures and the macroeconomy, a 
full understanding can come only through looking at these rela-
tionships over time. In this regard, several studies have examined 
the manner in which Pakistani defense expenditures have inter-
acted with various macroeconomic aggregates. These studies can 
be roughly broken into four types: (1) Causation Analysis, 3 where 
an attempt is made to assess whether defense expenditures initiate 
economic change or, in contrast, are affected by changes in the 
macroeconomy; for example, do increases in defense expenditure 
cause a follow-on change in the economy, or instead, do economic 
changes result in movements in defense funding? (2) Linkage 
Identification, where the strengths of the identified causal patterns 
3 An excellent review of causality concepts and the methods used to test for causal 
relationships is found in Zellner (1988). See also Granger (1988). The tests reported here 
are all of the Granger type. 
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are estimated; that is, how much does a rupee of defense expendi-
tures alter GDP over time? (3) Budgetary Priority Analysis, where 
expenditure priorities and budgetary tradeoffs are identified, and 
(4) Modeling, where, drawing on 1, 2, and 3, defense expenditures 
are examined in the context of alternative fiscal packages; for 
example, how does varying the existing size of the budgetary 
deficit affect the manner in which defense expenditures affect the 
macroeconomy? The present study falls in this category. 
Causation and Linkages 
The main finding (Looney, 1991) from analysis of the causal 
links between defense and the economy is that the impact of 
defense expenditures on GDP has shifted over time. In an earlier 
period (1958-73), defense expenditures had a negative impact on 
economic growth, while in the latter period (1973-), this impact 
has shifted to a positive one. Specifically: 
• The earlier negative impact appears to have been directly 
associated with the speed of increase in defense expenditures. 
That is during periods of rapid mobilization (i.e., the arms 
race with India4), defense expenditures had a negative impact 
on the economy. That is, increased defense expenditures dur-
ing this period dampened the growth in GDP. 
• After 1973 (and at a time when Pakistani defense expendi-
tures were not modified by developments in India) (Looney, 
1991), increased growth in the economy provided additional 
resources for defense. In turn, defense expenditures stimu-
lated further growth. 
• In contrast, there were no strong linkages from nondefense 
expenditures to economic growth. 
Another pattern of significance (Looney, 1991) involves the 
relationship between defense and nondefense expenditures. There 
has been a tendency over time fdr defense expenditures to lead 
in the timing of government allocations. That is, when defense 
expenditures change, a corresponding adjustment (again with a 
lag of several years) occurs in allocations to nondefense activities. 
As noted above, a recurring theme in the Pakistani literature 
is that of government deficits and or expenditures "crowding out" 
'For a quantitative analysis of this arms race and the linkages between Pakistan's defense 
expenditures and those of India, see Looney (1991). 
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private investment. This phenomenon has been confirmed by sev-
eral recent studies (Khan and Iqbal, 1991; Khan, 1988; Burney 
and Yasmeen, 1989; Haque and Montiel. 1992) that found evi-
dence that government activities have preempted funds that would 
otherwise have flowed into private capital formation. These pat-
terns have also been the subject of causality analysis (Looney, 
1994c). Here attention has focused on the direction of impact 
between the different broad types of public expenditures (defense, 
consumption, and general government investment) and potential 
sources of funding (deficits, domestic borrowing, and foreign bor-
rowing). That is, do expenditures create subsequent deficits and 
borrowing requirements or, instead, does lax fiscal policy and 
easy credit encourage expanded expenditures? The main patterns 
found suggest that: 
• Of the three types of government expenditures, those allo-
cated to defense appear to have the most complex budgetary 
linkages. In one sense the military faces a hard budgetary 
constraint in the sense that increases in past deficits tend to 
suppress the expansion in allocations to the military. On the 
other hand, increased defense expenditures do force an 
expansion in future deficits. 
• This general framework carried over to the borrowing pat-
terns associated with military expenditures. For most mea-
sures of domestic borrowing, higher growth rates in funding 
from the domestic markets tend to suppress the expansion 
in future military expenditures. These suppressing effects are 
most important in cases where the rate of borrowing (domes-
tic or foreign) expands over its anticipated (or longer term) 
growth rate. Still, feedback effects are present whereby mili-
tary expenditures are, in turn, generally funded in part 
through both domestic and foreign borrowing. 
• Since a large portion of public consumption consists of alloca-
tions to the military, the budgetary patterns of this expendi-
ture category are a bit similar to that characterizing defense, 
particularly consumption's relationship to the fiscal deficit. 
• Several important differences do occur, however. The major 
difference between defense expenditures and public con-
sumption is associated with the manner in which each is 
funded. Increased growth in public consumption definitely 
contributes to expanded domestic borrowing requirements 
over time. Also, the expansion in public consumption was 
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more constrained than defense during periods of expanded 
foreign borrowing. 
• Of the three types of government expenditures examined, 
general government investment has the strongest impact on 
the public sector deficit. 
• For all four measures of the deficit5, increases in general 
public investment tend to result in expanded fiscal imbalance. 
While expanded deficits (actual and deviations from the expo-
nential trend) facilitate a future expansion in public invest-
ment, this effect is weak compared with the impact of invest-
ment on the deficit. 
• A clear link also exists between expanded public-sector in-
vestment and increased future domestic borrowing require-
ments. Interestingly enough, few links exist between the 
growth in public investment and the country's pattern of 
external public borrowing. 
While these findings do not provide a definitive proof of the 
existence of the crowding-out mechanism in Pakistan, they are 
quite consistent with what one might find if the phenomena were 
present. Public investment and infrastructural development ap-
pear to have the least-stimulating (and sometimes negative) effect 
on private-sector investment. This is ironic given that a major 
purpose of these allocations is to provide a stimulus to follow 
on private investment. Clearly this effect sterns from the large 
demands placed on the domestic capital market by this type of 
expenditure. 
At the other extreme is defense. Again, a somewhat ironic 
pattern exists by which expanded military expenditures provide 
a generally strong stimulus to private investment in large-scale 
private manufacturing. While the analyses do not let us identify 
the cause of this stimulus (general Keynesian demand expansion 
and/or direct linkages to the cou.ntry's military procurement pro-
gram), the fact remains that the government has shown restraint 
in funding defense expenditures once domestic borrowing begin 
to accelerate. 
General public consumption falls somewhere between defense 
and investment in affecting the private sector's willingness (or 
ability) to commit capital to manufacturing. While the government 
5 Again. only the results for the actual (realized) deficit are presented here. 
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does fund increased consumption through expanded domestic bor-
rowing, the magnitudes involved are not nearly as great as with 
investment. Thus, government consumption is still able to provide 
a net positive stimulus to small scale private investors (who pre-
sumably are not as reliant on the domestic capital markets as are 
their larger scale counterparts). 
Budgetary Patterns 
While the development of a sophisticated model6 for analyzing 
budgetary priorities is beyond the scope of this paper, several 
principles can be used to obtain an estimate of the relative priority 
granted the major expenditure items:7 
• If one budgetary item impacts negatively on another and the 
second category does not in return impact negatively on the 
first, then the first is of higher priority. 
• Impacts stemming from unexpected increases in a budgetary 
item reveal more about budgetary priorities than a corre-
sponding change in expected magnitudes. Intuitively this rule 
assumes that governments reveal their true priorities more 
in times of uncertainty and/or emergency. 
• Deficit changes are of less significance than budgetary share 
changes, with unexpected changes in the deficit of greater 
significance in this regard than expected changes. 
• Long-run impacts provide greater insights as to priorities than 
that obtained from an examination of shorter-run patterns. 
Intuitively long-run patterns reflect continuity in government 
decision-making, whereas short-run patterns may be affected 
by random, exogenous events. 
Based on these rules, several general conclusions emerge from an 
assessment8 of the government's budget:9 
• Since long-run defense expenditures impact negatively on 
development and development does not reduce defense over 
time, defense has a higner priority than development. 
6For example, along the lines proposed in Encarnacion (1970). 
'As developed in Looney (1994b). 
8 Short run and long run refer to the duration of impact of defense expenditures. For 
a detailed description of these properties, see Looney (1993). 
9For a comparison of Pakistan's budget priorities with other regional countries, see 
Looney (1993). 
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• Defense has a positive short-run affect on interest payments 
with increased shares of the budget allocated to interest neu-
tral (in both the short and long run) with regard to the share 
of the budget allocated to defense. Again, this is a clear-cut 
case of defense having the higher priority. 
• Priorities between development expenditures and interest 
payments are much more difficult to deduce: Development 
expenditures reduce (in both the short and long run) the 
budgetary share going to interest payments. In turn, increased 
interest payments reduce (again in both the short and long 
run) the shares of the budget going to the capital account. 
• Complicating identification of the development/interest pri-
orities is the fact that in both cases the expected and unex-
pected deficit terms are negative. Both variables are reduced 
with increases in the deficits. Furthermore, these patterns 
occur in both the short and longer run. However, since the 
deficit terms are stronger in the case of development (with a 
higher level of statistical significance), it appears that interest 
payments have a· slightly higher priority than that afforded 
development. 
While the budgetary shares of the other main items of the 
budget were not directly tested against each other, it is probably 
safe to conclude that subsidies are next in priority. While their 
allocations suffer with increases in defense expenditures, they 
are immune from cuts due to expanded interest payments or 
development allocations. In addition, the government appears 
willing to run higher deficits to fund these programs. Administra-
tion has the next highest priority. This category appears is immune 
to cuts stemming from increases in defense, interest, or develop-
ment. In addition, these allocations do not seem to face cuts during 
periods of increased deficits. 
In conclusion, one may quibble over the importance of adminis-
tration, social security/welfare, and other expenditures. However, 
the general picture of Pakistan's budgetary priorities is fairly clear. 
Defense expenditures have by far the highest priority. While the 
government may cut these programs when deficits expand more 
than anticipated, the government is inclined to cut other programs10 
rather than reduce the budgetary share going to the military. 
10 The actual expenditure on nondefense categories is also determined by the willingness 
of the government to increase borrowing and the deficit to fund these programs. See 
Frederiksen and Looney (1994). 
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Modeling 
In an earlier study (Looney, 1994a) focused on determining the 
rough magnitudes of the impact of defense (and nondefense) 
expenditures on the major economic aggregates, it was found 
that there was a generally positive link between defense and the 
economy. On the other hand, nondefense expenditures had a 
negative impact on economic growth. Given this, it was found 
that the actual impacts of defense and nondefense expenditures 
can change fairly dramatically as the economic context (i.e., the 
fiscal deficit) in which these expenditures occur varies. 
DEFENSE AND THE MACROECONOMY 
Drawing on previous causal and econometric tests, a 33-equa-
tion econometric policy model was developed.11 Here our main 
concern was identifying the main linkages between defense expen-
ditures and economic activity. These links are assumed to be both 
direct (as with Keynesian demand creation) and indirect (through 
possible deficit-induced .crowding out of private activity and/or 
diversion of private savings to the public sector. Concerning the 
more important individual equations:12 
• Gross Domestic Product is affected mainly by expansion in 
the private and public stocks of capital, employment, and 
military expenditures. Here it should be noted that the links 
between GDP and nondefense expenditures were not statisti-
cally significant. 
• Employment increases with an expanded population together 
with increments to the stock of public infrastructure. 
• Defense expenditures expand in line with the general size of 
the economy. However, allocations to the military compete 
with infrastructure for funding. In addition, expanded levels 
of foreign borrowing in the previous year constrain allocations 
to the military. The sami is also true for increased levels of 
indebtedness to the international institutions. 
11 A full description of the model, its estimation, and the underlying database are available 
from the author upon request. 
1iTwo-stage least-squares estimations. See SORITEC (1993) for a description of the 
procedure. Estimates over different time intervals suggested that the coefficients were 
stable enough for simulation purposes. Based on the Durbin-Watson statistic, there does 
not appear to be a serious problem of autocorrelation. 
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• Nondefense public expenditures also expanded in line with 
GDP. However, allocations to this category were reduced by 
short-run increases in the defense budget. 
• Gross National Savings13 expand with the general growth of 
the economy. However, these funds are preempted (or 
crowded out) by the current fiscal deficit, as well as the deficit 
in the previous year. 
• Private investment in large-scale manufacturing followed a lag 
adjustment pattern whereby investment in any one year was 
undertaken to bridge the gap between investor's optimal and 
actual capital stocks. The optimal level of private investment 
was in turn influenced by defense expenditures and ability 
to attract foreign funding. Again, however, this category of 
private investment was crowded out by the fiscal deficit. 
• Private investment in nonmanufacturing activities expanded 
with the total size of the economy and availability of savings. 
In contrast to investment in manufacturing, however, this 
type of investment was discouraged by expanded defense 
expenditures. 
• Government credit from the monetary system was also related 
to past deficits and short-run movements in defense expendi-
tures. 
• Inflation is largely a function of expanded credit to the public 
sector, together with movements in the international price 
level. 
• Public borrowing in the domestic markets was largely a func-
tion of the fiscal deficit. However, the authorities' ability to 
borrow internationally reduced some of the pressures on the 
domestic capital markets. 
• Public borrowing in the foreign capital markets was also 
largely a function of the fiscal deficit. Again, however, in-
creases in defense expenditures ceteris paribus reduced the 
amount of funding from this ..source. 
To test the general accuracy of the model, the economy was 
simulated using actual historical data. The results suggest that 
there are no compounded errors (accumulated errors from each 
13 It should be noted that Gross National Savings is used here. Due to the large component 
.:>i 1''ur\:.ers remitt&.ni:e!., Gr.,;,-s Dvmest',~ ~"'"''·g> \'.u...--mates erratY...all'f. These remitta= 
are no doubt purely exogenous and as such tend to mask the relationship between govern-
ment expenditures, the deficit, and the change in savings. 
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individual relationship). In particular, the key variable GDP was 
predicted with a high degree of accuracy, the greatest error in 
recent years being 2.3 percent in 1991. Over the last 10 years the 
simulation error averaged 1.2 percent. 
Although typically volatile, private investment was also simu-
lated with a high degree of accuracy. The average error for the 
1981-91 period was only 2.7 percent. For employment, this figure 
was 1.1 percent. Given that defense expenditures are also affected 
by a set of noneconomic factors, the model depicted this variable's 
past values reasonably well, with the average error over the last 
10 years equal to 3.1 percent. In any case, given that defense will 
be treated exogenously (as a policy variable) in the simulations 
that follow, this error will disappear. 
In summary, the model captures the fundamental facing Paki-
stani policymakers. Looked at in isolation, defense expenditures 
have tended to positively influence the economy. However, if 
these expenditures are funded with increased levels of deficit fi-
nancing, the subsequent crowding out of private investment may 
actually result not only in increased inflation but, more impor-
tantly, in a net negative impact on the economy. The inability 
of nondefense expenditures other than infrastructure to impact 
positively on the economy has only compounded this dilemma. 
In any case, the concern of external creditors over the country's 
high defense burden will, in all likelihood, increasingly constrain 
allocations to the military. 
Alternative Policies 
A major question is whether fiscal deficits have been "too high" 
in the sense that macroeconomic performance may have been 
better had they not been that high. To assess this possibility, 
government expenditures were classified as either defense and 
nondefense. Using the model described above, we simulated eco-
nomic environments over tne period 1974-91, first, by reducing 
defense expenditures 10 percent from their actual values (while 
holding nondefense expenditures at their historical values); sec-
ond, by lowering nondefense expenditures by 10 percent from 
their actual values (again maintaining defense expenditures at 
their historical values); and finally by increasing government reve-
nues by 10 percent with public expenditures set at their historical 
(actual) values. 
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The results provide some interesting insights to the country's 
policy dilemmas. For example, lowering defense expenditures by 
10 percent each year: 
• Generally reduced the country's Gross Domestic Product. 
Dividing the 1974-91 period into two equal nine-year groups 
1974-1982 and 1983-91, GDP would have been lowered an 
average of 2.9 percent in the first period and 2.3 percent in 
the latter. 
• Private investment would have been significantly lower in an 
environment of reduced defense expenditures. On average, 
private investment would have been reduced by 7.7 percent 
per year during the 1974-82 period and by 9 percent over 
the 1983-91 interval. 
• In general gross national savings would have improved with 
lower allocations to the military. This improvement declined 
over time, averaging 3.0 percent during the 1974-82 period 
but only 1.8 for the years through 1991. 
• Finally, foreign debt would have been considerably lower, 
particularly because of the cumulative effect of reduced ex-
penditures i.e. while reductions were modest in the first period 
(2.2 percent) they accelerated to 9.4 percent over the 1983-
1991 period. 
Reducing non-defense government expenditures produced 
some divergent results: 
• In contrast to defense expenditures, holding non-defense ex-
penditures to 90 percent of their historical values would have 
provided a mild stimulus to GDP. GDP would have averaged 
around 1.2 percent higher during the 1974-82 period, increas-
ing to 3.0 percent from 1983 through 1991. 
• While private investment would have declined, these reduc-
tions were modest, averaging <!lnly 1.1 percent during the 
1974-82 period and 1.8 percent thereafter. 
• The most significant contrast with defense involves the savings 
rate. This would have increased by 13.2 percent on average 
(versus 3.0 for defense) during the first period and 15.9 per-
cent (vs. 1.8 percent for defense) for the interval through 
1991. 
• While foreign debt would have been reduced, the gains in 
this area would have been much less significant than those 
394 R. E. Looney 
associated with defense cutbacks (0.5 percent vs. 2.2 for de-
fense during the first period and 2.7 vs. 9.4 for the second). 
Another logical fiscal strategy would have been to seriously 
expand the government's revenue base and collection. Here a 10 
percent increase over the actual level of revenues would have: 
• Gradually increased GDP from 1.1 percent during 74-82 pe-
riod to 2.2 over the 1983-81 interval. 
• On average, reduced private investment by less than 1 % per 
annum. 
• Produced a dramatic increase in the country's savings rate 
with increases averaging 12.4 percent for the first period and 
11.7 percent in the second. 
• Modestly reduced foreign debt, averaging 0.5 percent during 
1974-82 and 1.4 percent through 1991. 
To sum up while it is important to stress the problem posed by 
deficits, obviously for policy purposes just as important an issue 
is the optimal means of. reducing the deficit-clearly some areas 
of expenditure reduction are more productive than others in 
achieving this end. The critical question should be: is there an 
optimal mix of policies that will assure the economy can maintain 
high rates of non-inflationary, relatively debt free growth during 
the remaining years of the twentieth century? A new adjustment 
program is being put in place for this purpose. Clearly this is an 
opportune time to examine the current program and assess the 
alternatives open to the government. 
FUTURE ALTERNATIVES 
Realistically Pakistan's fiscal options are likely to be narrowly 
constrained by the International Monetary Fund. In November 
of 1993 the government negotiated an agreement with the IMF 
to borrow a total of Special E>rawing Rights (SDR) 1,200 million 
($1,670 million) in a combination of concessionary and market 
rate loans if it implements reforms and reaches certain economic 
targets (MEED, 1993). 
Policy Constraints and Objectives 
The loans will be a combination of an enhanced structural ad-
justment facility that carries an interest rate of 0.5 percent, an 
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extended fund facility at market rates and a public-sector adjust-
ment loan (the $350 million standby credit approved by the IMF 
in September is not included in the new agreement). As part of 
the agreement the government pledges to take measures to meet 
the following economic targets (MEED, 1993): 
• Reach an average GDP growth rate of 6.5 percent over the 
next three years. GDP was expected to grow by 7.5 percent 
in 1994 depending on the size of the crucial cotton crop, 
compared with a record low of 3 percent GDP growth in 
1993. 
• Bring inflation down to 5 percent. The government has fore-
cast an inflation rate of 8 percent for 1994 compared with 
more than 10 percent in 1993. 
• Boost foreign exchange reserves. Reserves fell steadily in 
1993 to reach $222 late that year (compared with $1,000 in 
January of 1993). 
• Reduce the burden of foreign and local debt. In late 1993 
the state owed $23,000 million to foreign lenders, of which 
$4,500 million was short term debt. 
• Continue the tariff, tax and financial reforms, privatization 
and deregulation policies launched in the late 1980s. 
To date, the government has complied with IMF pressure by 
increasing energy prices and introducing a controversial agricul-
tural tax as a means of reducing the fiscal deficit (MEED, 1993). 
Petroleum and utility prices have been adjusted substantially, to-
gether with the introduction of a mechanism to make domestic 
petroleum prices more responsive to changes in international 
prices. In addition, the authorities' fiscal program for 1993-94 
envisages a reduction in defense expenditures by about one per-
cent of GDP, along with a containment of nonessential expendi-
tures (IMF, 1994). 
The authorities have tightened monetary policy through upward 
adjustments in the rates of return and reductions in the scope of 
concessional and mandatory credit schemes. The framework for 
concluding effective monetary policy has been strengthened 
through the provision of increased autonomy to the central bank. 
Finally, the Pakistan rupee was devalued by 10 percent at the 
outset of the 1993-94 fiscal year. This has been followed by a series 
of small exchange-rate adjustments implying a total devaluation of 
12 percent via a vis the U.S. dollar and a real effective depreciation. 
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Summing up, recent government policy and creditorstatements 
imply that the country will be pursuing a comprehensive set of 
objectives throughout the remainder of the 1990s. These include: 
• A stable rate of GDP growth of between 6.0 percent and 7.0 
percent per annum-in line with the average rate of growth 
since 1976. · 
• Employment growth of 2.8 percent to 3.1 percent-around 
the rate of growth of population and consistent with past 
rates.of job creation. 
• Inflation 5 percent or lower-somewhat below the historical 
range of 7-8 percent. 
• Foreign borrowing to expand at a rate slower than the general 
expansion in economic activity, that is, around 5 percent or 
less. 
• Defense expenditure to -decline to around 4-5 percent of 
GDP-down from the 6-7-percent range in the late 1980s 
early 1990s. 
• Government deficits to fall to 3-4 percent of GDP-down 
from the 6-percent figure reached in the early 1990s. 
• A general expansion in the share of savings in GDP up toward 
the range of 18-20 percent-typical values for countries at 
Pakistan's stage of development. 
• An expande~;· share of privat~ investment in GDP. 
Alternative Policy Mixes 
The critical question is whether and to what extent these objec-
tives are consistent and attainable. Of particular importance for 
the current study are the defense expenditure levels that would 
aid in the attainment of these goals. Again, using the model devel-
oped in Appendix B, several policy packages were examined in 
terms of their ability to impro-.re the country's economic fortunes. 
SIMULATION 1: No MAJOR Poucy INITIATIVES. As a benchmark, 
the model was solved with only the world rate of inflation set at 
3 percent per annum, population growth at 3 percent per annum, 
and exports at constant prices assumed to growth at an annual 
rate of 7.5 percent per annum. Here we are assuming no major 
shifts in past public expenditure or revenue decisions. Under these 
assumptions: 
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• The economy (GDP) would continue to expand in the 6.5-7.5 
range, with defense expenditures gradually slowing to less 
than 5 percent per annum by the end of the century. 
• Despite this slowing-down in defense expenditures, the mili-
tary burden (defense as a share of GDP) would remain well 
above 6 percent throughout this period. 
• There would be a gradual increase in nondefense expendi-
tures as a share of GDP-increasing from around 16 percent 
in 1992 to 18.4 percent by 2000. This pattern reflects the rapid 
expansion in government consumption during the 1980s. 
• Employment targets would be met with rates of growth aver-
aging around 3 percent. 
• The savings rate would increase, but only very gradually, 
reaching around 16 percent by the end of the century. This 
is well below the 18-20 percent assumed to be a precondition 
for self-sustained growth. 
• The fiscal deficit would expand throughout this period with 
its share in GDP also reaching unacceptable rates. 
• Most unsatisfactory of the major indicators is the rate of 
inflation. With expenditure, savings, and deficits in the ranges 
noted, inflation would increase during this period, reaching 
slightly over 20 percent by the end of the century. 
• Reflecting these patterns, the external gap would reach nearly 
8 percent of GDP, a figure probably unattainable given the 
likely reluctance of foreign creditors to finance deficits of this 
magnitude. 
SIMULATION 2: ALTERNATIVE DEFENSE EXPENDITURE STRATEGIES. 
For most developing countries, a logical alternative at this point 
would be to determine the extent to which economic performance 
might be improved through cutting defense expenditures. As 
noted above, however, the con~equences of this approach are not 
clear. On the one hand, defense expenditures appear to provide 
a positive stimulus to the economy, while, on the other, the deficits 
associated with increased allocations to the military may be fi-
nanced in a way that preempts funds that might flow into private 
investment. To assess the net magnitude of these effects, several 
alternative defense budgets were examined. In these simulations 
defense expenditures were assumed to expand at a constant rate 
(2.5%, 5.0%, and 7.5%) over the period to 2000. As a frame of 
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Figure 1. Pakistan: alternative defense-GDP scenarios. 
reference, defense expenditures averaged 7.2 percent over the 
1981-91and1986-91 periods. Under these assumptions (Figure 1): 
• The growth in GDP begins to decline after 1994, with the 
rate of decline largely a function of the expansion in defense. 
• With defense expenditures endogenous (determined by the 
model's equations-Simulation 1), the deceleration in GDP 
growth is fairly gradual, leveling off at around 6.5 percent 
per annum by the end of the century. 
• With defense expanded at a rate of 7.5 percent per annum 
(providing there were no fiscal or inflationary constrains), it 
would be possible to stabilize the growth of GDP at slightly 
over 7 percent per annum. 
• Increases in defense expenditures at a constant 5.5 percent 
or 2.5 percent would (in the absence of any other policy 
changes) cause the economy to decelerate fairly rapidly, 
reaching a growth of about 5.8 percent and 4.6 percent, respec-
tively, by the end of the century. 
• The impact of defease expenditures on private investment 
reflected the anticipated pattern (Figure 2). The share of 
national resources devoted to private investment increases 
with lower rates of expansion in military expenditures. 
• Concerning the fiscal imbalance (Figure 3), only the deficit 
associated with a 2.5-percent expansion in defense expendi-
tures is likely to fall within an acceptable range (around 4.8 % 
of GDP). Without simultaneous reforms in tax structure or 
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Figure 2. Pakistan: alternative defense-private investment scenarios. 
2000 
collection, significant reductions in the deficit as a share of 
GDP are unlikely under any of the proposed scenarios. 
• Finally, simply just constraining defense expenditures even 
at low rates of growth (with no other complementary stabiliza-
tion measures) would most likely not stave off increases in 
inflation. As noted above, inflationary pressures have been 
building for some time. Even at an average annual growth 
of only 2.5 percent for defense expenditures (Figure 4), it 
would be difficult for the country to reduce inflation below 
10 percent per annum during the remainder of this century. 
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Figure 3. Pakistan: alternative defense-fiscal deficit scenarios. 
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These simulations suggest that although the general rate of 
growth of GDP may increase with defense expenditures, the ad-
verse effects associated with this expansion negate any resort to 
a defense-led growth model. The real question for policymakers 
must center on ways of improving economic performance while 
constraining defense expenditures to lower-than-historic rates of 
expansion. 
Several policy packages are logical: 
FISCAL PROGRAM 1. First, while holding defense expenditures 
at a 2.5-percent rate of growth, the authorities might also constrain 
foreign borrowing. Given the country's current debt situation and 
the high proportion of the budget allocated to debt servicing, 
reduced rates of external borrowing are probably a good objective 
in and of themselves. Credit from this source is set to grow at 5.0 
percent per annum. This rate is considerably lower than the aver-
age of 22 percent over the. 1986-91 period, but in line with the 
average of 4.6 percent for the 1981-91 period as a whole. 
FISCAL PROGRAM 2. To strengthen the country's acute infrastruc-
tural bottlenecks, this policy package would shift more resources 
toward public investment in transport, energy, communications, 
and the like. Expanded expenditures in these areas would also 
help to offset the deflationary effects associated with the planned 
reductions in defense expenditures. As a starting point, infrastruc-
ture investment was set at an expansion of 7.5 percent per annum, 
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up somewhat from the 6.1-percent average over the 1981-91 pe-
riod and 5.1-percent expansion during the 1986-91 period. 
FISCAL PROGRAM 3. This ·set of policies would add increased 
revenue collection to Program 2. Here, implementation of the · 
agriculture tax and better tax collection should be enough to 
sustain an increase in revenues of around 7.5 percent p~r annum. 
This rate is up some from the 6.8-percent growth during 1981-91 
and 5.5 percent for the 1986-91 period. 
FISCAL PROGRAM 4. Finally, the last package of reforms would 
modify Program 3 by constraining nondefense (and noninfrastruc-
ture) expenditures to a maximum rate of expansion of 7 .5 percent 
per annum. As noted above, one of the main causes of the country's 
current fiscal crisis has been an acceleration in nondefense expen-
ditures. These averaged 8.4 percent during 1981-91, accelerating 
to 9.4 from 1986-91. 
Main Findings 
Of particular interest is the manner in which these packages 
might improve economic performance over that likely to occur 
simply through constraining the growth in defense expenditures 
at 2.5 percent per annum. 
GROWTH. GDP growth gradually improves as the fiscal pro-
grams are made more comprehensive (Figure 5). That is, simply 
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restraining foreign borrowing does not significantly improve the 
general rate of expansion of the economy. Nor is there little 
difference between the growth path obtained through carrying 
out Program 1 and that of simply expanding defense expenditures 
with foreign borrowing being determined though the models' rela-
tionships. There are several other patt~ms of interest: 
• While Program 4 yields the highest rate of growth throughout 
the 1990s, it converges with Program 3 by the end of the 
century. 
• Program 2 starts out the 1990s with relatively low rates of 
growth. However, after 1994-95 this program's performance 
improves significantly over that associated with Program 1. 
INFLATION. Inflationary pressures proved relatively hard to 
dampen (Figure 6). Constraining defense expenditures to a 2.5-
percent growth path, together \vith restricting foreign borrowing 
(Program 1) and increasing infrastructure investment (Program 
2) while keeping the rate of inflation considerably below that of 
the purely endogenous forecast, were unable to put the economy 
on a declining inflation path. This leads to several important policy 
implications: 
• A clear ingredient of any anti-inflationary program must be 
tax reform. Even expanding government revenues at 7.5 per-
cent per annum (Program 3) was not sufficient to reduce 
inflation below 6 percent per annum. 
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• However, supplementing tax reform with constraints on non-
defense expenditure (Program 4) quickly suppressed infla-
tion. This policy package lowered inflation below 5 percent 
through much of the period under consideration. 
BUDGET DEFICIT. The pattern of budget deficits was similar to 
those characterizing inflation. Without tax reform, the programs 
were not capable of significantly reducing the share of the fiscal 
deficit in GDP. Specifically, with constrained defense expenditures 
at 2.5 percent, Program 1, and Program 2 all stabilized the deficit 
at around 5.0 percent (with Program 2 eventually reducing this 
ration to 4.5 at the end of the century). 
On the other hand, fiscal performance improved dramatically 
with expanded revenues (Program 3) and constrained nondefense 
expenditures (Program 4). Specifically, by 2000, Program 3 
brought the deficit down to around 2.6 percent of GDP (Figure 
7), and Program 4 brought the deficit down further toward 2.0 
percent. 
SAVINGS. As noted, increasing the rate of national savings must 
be a key objective in any fiscal program. In this regard, all five 
packages produced some improvement in this aggregate. Again, 
with the results (Figure 8) from the defense expenditure expansion 
of 2.5 percent, Program 1 and Program 2 were fairly similar, with 
savings increasing from about 14.5 percent in 1992 to slightly over 
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Tax reforms, however, contributed greatly to this objective, 
raising the saving rate to nearly 19 percent at the end of the period. 
Finally, constraints on non.defense expenditure expanded this rate 
a further 2 percent to slightly under 21 percent by 2000. 
PRIVATE INVESTMENT. Finally, increasing the share of national 
resources invested by the private sector is possible under all of 
the programs examined (Figure 9). Here improvements up to 
around 10.2 percent (from around 9.2% in 1992) are easily ob-
tained. As with the other macroeconomic aggregates, however, a 
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significant improvement in private investment depends critically 
on the willingness of the government to reduce its deficits. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In summing up, the fiscal pattern that developed in Pakistan 
during the 1980s and extending to the 1990s is not sustainable. An 
overexpansion in expenditures, both for defense and nondef ense 
purposes, together with sluggish revenues and excessive foreign 
borrowing, have created a situation in which further growth will 
be increasingly constrained by debt servicing, inflation, and short-
ages of domestic savings for private investors. 
However, given the complex nature of defense expenditures in 
both stimulating and suppressing growth, budgetary reductions in 
this area in and of themselves are unlikely to improve the country's 
economic performance. In fact, rapid reductions in defense are 
likely to impair the situation even further. On the other hand, 
modest efforts in tax reform are by far the most effective means 
at restoring fiscal stability.14 The optimal policy mix is one of tax 
reform together with defense-expenditure expansion constrained 
in the 2.5-percent range. Unforeseen events aside, this package 
would enable the country to meet the goals established by itself 
and its major creditors in restoring a rapid, self-sustaining growth 
in an environment characterized by a declihing defense burden. 
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